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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years there has been a shift in the devices that people use to do their 
computing. Of particular import has been the movement in the computing landscape towards 
mobile devices. As would be expected, the proliferation of mobile devices has led to an increase 
in their being a target for malware. In addition to this change in the sphere of personal 
computing devices there has, at the same time, been a shift of server side computation moving 
towards the cloud. There has been another development worth noting, a dramatic increase in 
the number of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) being created along with an increase in 
individual’s usage of technology, including mobile devices, to access their EMR. Because of the 
importance of keeping medical records secure due to Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and ethical concerns, security and limiting access are of the utmost 
importance. We implemented and tested a system herein to establish a connection between 
mobile devices and cloud services that is secure, usable and limits access to appropriate parties. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The computing landscape is shifting toward mobile platforms with an increased number 
of smart devices used as the preferred method of computing as compared to traditional 
devices. Along with this shift, there has been a proliferation of healthcare and well-being 
applications running on these smart devices. Thousands of these types of applications exist on 
both of the leading app stores, namely Apple’s App Store and Google’s Google Play. [1] These 
thousands of applications represent millions of downloads to smart devices. [2] Smart devices 
used for health and well-being applications are likely targets of cyber-attacks which 
compromise the privacy of device users. The push towards Electronic Health Records (EHR), the 
digitization of health records, can lead to large scale data breaches of medical information. [3] 
Use of EHR includes both ethical and legal responsibilities because of Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and requires special care. Therefore, smart devices 
using healthcare applications need to provide authorized access, and protect health data in 
transit and at rest against various threat models such as sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
 Because of the increasing security risk in mobile devices, coupled with healthcare 
increasingly using mobile devices to provide healthcare solutions, known as mHealth, via smart 
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devices there is a real and legitimate concern that a mobile device user’s information could be 
susceptible to loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. Since healthcare applications have 
become a growing market there is additional concern to developers concerning the strict HIPAA 
regulations outlining exactly how care must be taken of a patient’s data. Finally, because of 
these regulations data must be kept secure from endpoint to endpoint, from mobile device to 
server, whether it is cloud-based or not. 
  
Objectives of the Study 
 In this study we hope to implement a secured system with the purpose of allowing a 
mobile device to transmit healthcare-related information. This system will be created with the 
direct goal of creating a secured channel that the data may be sent through that is robust 
against many types of network attacks. In addition the system will be able to authenticate the 
three players involved in a data transaction, namely, the cloud server, mobile device, and the 
device user. The mobile device’s user will also be granted access to records that they have a 
right to access or modify based on access control roles which are setup using an open-source 
EMR server backend. The system will be tested for both performance and security. The scope of 
the study will be primarily tied to implementing and testing the application on an Android-
based mobile device. The application will connect to a virtual machine running on Amazon Web 
Services (AWS). While the system will be a proof of concept it will be limited to that and does 
not have an intended purpose as a production level application. 
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Significance of the Study 
 Mobile-to-cloud applications offer a unique opportunity for the healthcare industry. 
Modern smart phones are a powerhouse of sensors and connectivity. A smart phone may 
contain any number of sensors, including accelerometers, gyroscopes, rotation vector sensors, 
linear acceleration sensors, gravity sensors. These may be either hardware or software based. 
In addition smart phones have many methods of wireless communication including Wi-Fi, third 
generation (3G), long term evolution (LTE), Bluetooth and near field communication (NFC). This 
combination of sensors and connectivity make mobile devices ideally suited for use in mHealth 
including self-care and remote-monitoring. 
The study has the potential to demonstrate a working system that could be implemented in a 
real-world mHealth application used to send and retrieve patient data in HIPAA-compliant and 
secured manner. As mHealth applications continue to increase in number, the importance of 
creating a model by which to secure the applications becomes increasingly important so that a 
user’s healthcare data is not compromised. 
 
 
Trends in Computing 
Consistent trends in computing have been noticed in the past few years including a 
move away from traditional platforms such as desktop and notebook computing. Along with 
this decline, mobile devices have seen a surge in popularity. Along with that surge, threats to 
those mobile devices via malware have been increasing. Finally, cloud computing is on the rise 
throughout all segments of computing; personal, private sector, government, and academic. 
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Changes in Consumers’ Device Preference 
 In the past few years the landscape of computing has seen a coming paradigm shift in 
the manner of devices consumers are choosing to purchase.  There has been an increasing 
movement to mobile devices from more traditional devices such as the desktop PC. In 2013, 
968 million smartphones and 195 million tablets were sold. That represents a 46% year to year 
increase with 2012 sales at 796 million units of smart devices in total. Of that increase in sales 
of smart devices, tablets saw the largest growth year to year. With sales of 116 million in 2012, 
tablets increased by 68% reaching 195 million units sold throughout 2013. [4] [5] 
 This increase in smart device sales is contrasted by declining sales in the traditional PC 
market, including desktop PCs and notebooks. In 2013 traditional PCs had declining sales, with a 
decrease in units from 341 million in 2012 to 299 million units in 2013, a 12.3% decline. [6]  
 
Mobile Threats on the Rise 
 As would be expected, the rise in the popularity of mobile devices has led them to be 
more popular targets for malware attacks. During the first half of 2013 more than 51,000 new 
mobile malware threats were discovered, and were responsible for infecting approximately 21 
million devices. [7]  On the Android OS platform as of the second quarter of 2013 more than 
718,000 malicious and high risk mobile applications exist. [8] This represents a doubling of the 
number of malicious applications compared to the beginning of 2013. More importantly it took 
three years for the number of malicious applications to reach the level found at the beginning 
of 2013. [8] This is especially important when considering that in 2013, Android devices 
garnered approximately 78% of the smart phone market and 62% of the tablet market. [4] [5] 
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The Android-based smart devices provide fragmentation that malware developers 
exploit. That is to say, the burgeoning creation of different Android devices running different 
versions of the operating system has led to a multitude of different operating system versions 
that must be protected against threats. That fragmentation, coupled with only four percent of 
Android smart device users running the latest version of Android as of June 3, 2013, provides an 
incredibly broad target at which malware developers may take aim. [9] This is a problem that 
will continually exist within any fragmented operating system, and with the addition of devices 
on the market that cannot be updated except by a mobile carrier, users are unable to update 
their devices to the current version. Table 1.1 shows the overall fragmentation of the Android 
operating system as of September 9th, 2014. 
 
Table 1.1: Android Operating System Fragmentation 
 [10] 
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Increasing Popularity of Cloud Computing 
 Cloud computing is becoming more prevalent. Cloud computing can be defined as:  
“a type of parallel and distributed system consisting of a collection 
of inter-connected and virtualized computers that are dynamically 
provisioned and presented as one or more unified computing 
resource(s) based on service-level agreements established 
through negotiation between the service provider and 
consumers.” [11] 
 
Cloud computing is a service to customers via either infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or 
platform as a service (PaaS). These two methodologies are similar but distinctly different from 
one another. In the IaaS paradigm, the vendor manages the infrastructure that the customer 
uses. The infrastructure includes the “network, storage, compute resources and virtualization 
technology.” [12] PaaS encompasses all of what IaaS offers, but with the addition of an 
application development platform. This can include “operating systems, databases, middleware 
and up-to-date tools and services.” [12] There are three main categories in which IaaS cloud 
computing falls based upon a customer’s need, namely hosting of a single application or group 
of related applications, a virtual data center (VDC), or batch processing. [13]  
 Cloud-based IT systems are becoming increasingly prevalent in broad sectors of 
industry. CompTIA, the non-profit trade association whose goal it is to advance the interests of 
information technology (IT) professionals, released their 4th Annual Trends in Cloud Computing 
report in September, 2013. While year over year from 2012 there is still the same approximate 
percentage of companies not using cloud-based solutions, of the 90% that are using cloud-
based strategies there has been a marked increase in what portion of their IT portfolio uses a 
cloud solution. [14] 
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Trends in Healthcare 
While there have been changes in the landscape of computing, the healthcare industry 
has been going through changes of its own. This is in no small part due to changes in 
computing. One of the most prevalent changes in healthcare recently is the move towards EHR 
as the prevalent form of maintaining records in the healthcare industry. Because of the design 
of EHRs being able to be accessed and viewed by multiple parties, it is important to consider 
that these records will need some sort of mechanism to control which individuals are allowed 
to access, read, and write to specific files or information. In addition the concept of the EHR 
was created so that they could be used meaningfully as defined by three concepts explicitly 
stated in the Stage 1 definition of EHRs: 
 “Complete and accurate information. With electronic health records, providers 
have the information they need to provide the best possible care. Providers will 
know more about their patients and their health history before they walk into 
the examination room. 
 Better access to information. Electronic health records facilitate greater access 
to the information providers need to diagnose health problems earlier and 
improve the health outcomes of their patients. Electronic health records also 
allow information to be shared more easily among doctors' offices, hospitals, 
and across health systems, leading to better coordination of care. 
 Patient empowerment. Electronic health records will help empower patients to 
take a more active role in their health and in the health of their families. 
Patients can receive electronic copies of their medical records and share their 
health information securely over the Internet with their families.” [15] 
  
The third portion of the Stage 1 meaningful use definition, namely patient 
empowerment, is especially important when considering the use of a mobile device. A mobile 
device can be used to empower a patient medically in a couple of different ways. Self-care is 
increasingly important in an individual’s attempt to meet their healthcare goals. mHealth is a 
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popular way for individuals to perform self-care. The Pew Research Center’s Mobile Health 
2012 report found that 31% of adult cell phone owners in the U.S. use their phone to look up 
health or medical information. Considering that 85% of U.S. adults own a cell phone, this 
represents approximately 26% of all U.S. adults who use a cell phone for mHealth purposes. 
This is an increase from approximately 14% in a study done in 2010. [16] The report also states 
that one in five of the 45% of U.S. adults who own a smart phone have installed at least one 
healthcare application. In addition to self-care, remote patient monitoring is on the rise. 
Remote patient monitoring can be accomplished through many venues, e.g. specialized devices, 
mobile devices, etc. In 2012 the market for remote patient monitoring was estimated to be 
valued at $104.5 million. By 2019 it is forecasted that the market will reach a value of $296.5 
million. Much of this increase is due to the increase of chronic diseases such as diabetes, whose 
prevalence is expected to reach 29.6% in the U.S. by 2030. [17] 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 Our system, the mHealth Secure Portal, uses some previously developed functionality 
such as work in visual password systems, as well as work in securing mHealth systems. Much 
work has been completed in the fields of cryptography and encryption, and while very broad 
and deep research areas, some aspects are particular to this system. 
 
Visual Password System 
One of the most important aspects of the mHealth Secure Portal is the visual password 
system. Visual passwords offer benefits over standard textual based passwords. Visual 
passwords function by having the user select the images that make up their password in lieu of 
the keyboard characters that make up a text-based password. By mapping an image to 
numerical value, one can increase the numerical probability that a password will be much 
harder to determine programmatically. [18] [19] [20] [21] The use of visual passwords force the 
user to use a stronger password than a traditional text-based password. There is an added 
benefit in that a user cannot write down a visual password, further strengthening the 
authentication provided by a visual password system. [20] In addition to adding increased 
security visual password systems can be easier for a user to engage with since images are easier 
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to remember than strings of characters. [22] [23] There can be, however, a larger potential for 
shoulder surfing attacks of these types of visual password systems depending on 
implementation. [23] 
A study done at the University of Alabama performed in 2004 has shown that after a 
week of use there were fewer failed log in attempts using a visual password system than with a 
password and PIN-based system. In addition, the study noted that a visual password system can 
be easier to use as the keyboards on small handheld devices can lead to miskeyed values being 
entered in a password-based system. [23] Another study done at Carleton University in Ottawa 
showed that users of a visual password system had login accuracy rates of 96%. [18] Further, as 
a comparison of visual passwords versus textual passwords, researchers at the University of 
California Berkeley found that participants in a study had a 90% rate of success in completing 
authentication with a visual-based system in comparison with approximately 70% success when 
using passwords and PINs. [20] 
 
Securing Healthcare Information 
Since there is an aging population in the U.S., and because there has been a burgeoning 
of the mobile device market, it is natural that there has been abundant research done in the 
securing of healthcare systems that are based around mobile devices. In addition, this research 
is important because there are real ethical, as well as legal ramifications when these types of 
mHealth systems are put into practice. Another important aspect of any mHealth system is that 
it offers the ability of healthcare providers to be more efficient with their time. [24] [25] [26] 
[27] 
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One of the basic aspects of HIPAA compliance deals with securing a patient’s healthcare 
information. Therefore a system that transfers this type of information must be robust in terms 
of being secure. Researchers at National Chung Hsing University came up with a novel approach 
using a password on a mobile device along with a smart card. This type of approach is 
interesting in that it provides a form of two-factor authentication. [25] Researchers at 
Velammal Engineering College in Chennai, India have proposed a system that incorporates 
access control. [24] This is an important aspect of any HIPAA compliant system, as it is stated 
that access control restrictions must be put in place. The researchers from Chennai focused on 
aspects of authentication and encryption as well. Finally, a system was proposed by a group 
from the University of Oslo. As with the system with the Chinese University, this system uses a 
two-factor authentication mechanism along with encryption. [26] 
There are many different encryption methods and techniques. There have however 
been a couple of studies that look directly at our concerns. [28] [29] The mHealth Secure Portal 
is concerned with two spheres, cloud computing and wireless networks. Researchers at 
Menoufia University in Egypt have performed testing on known and popular modern 
encryption techniques. Their findings show that AES encryption, our proposed encryption 
method for EHR data, is suitable specifically for use within a cloud-based server, and even more 
specifically using an Amazon Web Services Elastic Compute Cloud instance. [28] An analysis of 
public key cryptography gives insight into our particular use case. The analysis was done on 
public key cryptography in wireless sensor networks. The results of the work completed by 
Menoufia University show that public key cryptography, especially RSA techniques, may not be 
suitable for wireless sensor networks because of the time and energy costs associated. [29] 
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However, smart phones possess much more processing power than a wireless sensor node and 
so may be practical for our particular application. 
 
 Summary 
 There is a strong indicator that a visual password system may have the benefit of 
increased security and ease of use that textual passwords just can’t emulate. The mHealth 
Secure Portal incorporates the use of a visual password system to take advantage of the added 
security and usability. Mobile healthcare is a field that has many nuances. Authentication 
techniques are varied, and while some provide better solutions than others, there is no solution 
yet that can be considered one-size-fits-all. Smart cards as two-factor authentication along with 
a standard text-based password is a good methodology, however it does not deal with the 
possibility of a loss of a device, which could include the loss of the two-factor authentication 
token.  Many types of encryption have been used in the mobile sphere. Research shows that 
current best practice is strong, and resilient against attacks. In the following sections our novel 
approach will be discussed and the benefits of our system will be shown.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A NOVEL APPROACH TO PROTECTING MOBILE HEALTHCARE APPLICATIONS IN MOBILE CLOUD 
 
Introduction 
To provide a secure system that will meet HIPAA regulations, users’ data must be kept 
secure. To accomplish this, the devices involved and the user must be authenticated, and data 
must be kept encrypted to assure that it cannot be viewed by potential attackers. Further, 
access to data must be given only when the user requesting the data has rights to it. There are 
multiple threat models that must be overcome to achieve this. Through the use of 
public/private key pairs combined with a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange, the mobile device 
and server will be authenticated and a secure, encrypted channel will be created. Following 
this, the user will authenticate using a visual password system. To prevent the viewing of data 
by those without rights, an access control mechanism will be put in place on the server side. 
Data can then be sent between the server and mobile device in a secure manner. Figure 3.1 
shows a sequence diagram for the mHealth Secure Portal. To ensure that the mHealth Secure 
Portal functions as intended, testing will be performed on the application.  
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Figure 3.1: mHealth Secure Portal Sequence Diagram 
 
 
Secure Channel 
 Communications between the mobile device and server must be kept secure to 
meet HIPAA requirements and to keep a user’s EHR secured. To accomplish this, we need a 
shared secret that can be used between the mobile device and cloud server when they first 
contact each other. The dangerous part about the first connection between the two actors is 
that it is on an insecure channel. A DH key exchange is used as a means of exchanging keys to 
 15 
calculate a shared secret. RSA asymmetric encryption is blended with a DH key exchange to 
prevent this type of attack. Figure 3.2 shows a sequence diagram that represents our secure 
channel and authentication protocol. 
 
Figure 3.2: Secure Channel and Authentication Protocol Sequence Diagram 
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The protocol has multiple steps involved in creating this secure channel while also 
authenticating the mobile device and the cloud server. After a mobile device opens a socket 
with the listening server, the server responds with its public portion of the DH exchange, 
𝑔𝑦 mod 𝑝, which is calculated with its secret y. The mobile device takes this value, raises it to 
the power of its secret x, and uses the resulting value to calculate K, a symmetric 
encryption/decryption key created using the advanced encryption standard (AES). The mobile 
device then signs the server’s public DH value with its private key after which it encrypts the 
resulting value with K. This is then sent to the cloud server along with the mobile device’s public 
portion of the DH exchange, 𝑔𝑥 mod 𝑝, which has been calculated with the mobile device’s 
secret, x. After the server receives this information from the mobile device it can calculate the 
symmetric encryption/decryption key K by using AES on the value resulting from raising the 
mobile device’s public portion of the DH exchange to it secret y. After the server has calculated 
K is can use the key to decrypt what was sent from the mobile device. The decrypted value is 
the server’s public portion of the DH exchange signed with the private RSA key of the mobile 
device. By using the public RSA key of the mobile device to decrypt this, the server should be 
able to then compare its public portion of the DH exchange with the resulting value. If the two 
values match, the server knows two things: the encryption/decryption key K which can be used 
for secure channel communication, and it knows that the mobile device is indeed who it says it 
is and so is authenticated. If however the values do not match, it can then be assumed that an 
impostor was contacting the server and hence the connection is dropped. 
 Assuming the values did however match, the server signs the mobile device’s public 
portion of the DH exchange with the server’s private RSA key, and encrypts that data with the 
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symmetric encryption/decryption key K and sends this to the mobile device. The mobile device 
uses encryption/decryption key K to decrypt the data received, after which it uses the server’s 
public RSA key to decrypt the result from the previous step. If the final result of this matches 
the mobile device’s public portion of the DH exchange, then the mobile device now knows that 
the server is who it says it is and hence has been authenticated, and also has the symmetric 
encryption/decryption key K, which be used for secure channel communication. If the two 
values do not match, then the mobile device knows there is a malicious user on the other end 
impersonating the cloud server and so closes the socket, terminating communication. 
  If everything matches, both devices have been authenticated. In addition there is a 
one-time symmetric encryption/decryption key K, that can be used only during this session. 
This provides a means for the two authenticated devices to communicate on an encrypted, 
secure channel. It is important to note that both the server and the mobile device must have 
knowledge of the other’s public key. As with any public/private key system, if the private key of 
either has been compromised, impersonation can occur by an attacker. Once the mobile device 
and cloud server have been authenticated and a secure channel setup for communication, then 
a human user can enter their password. 
 
Authentication 
 One of the key pieces to the system’s design is the ability for actors using the system to 
authenticate themselves. In this case the actors include the mobile device user, the mobile 
device, and the cloud server. It is important that all three actors are authenticated for each 
session to prevent various threats against the system’s integrity and so that in the case of 
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multiple users using a single mobile device, only the appropriate data would be shown to them 
based on their access level. These threats will be discussed in detail in the Threat Models 
section later in the study. The actors will be authenticated in different manners depending on 
their role. 
 For authenticating the mobile device and the virtual server asymmetric cryptography 
is used. This is accomplished through the use of public/private key pairs that are created using 
the RSA algorithm. This algorithm is a three part process: key creation, encryption, and 
decryption. RSA creates two keys, one that is public and one that is private. This portion of the 
system is actually implemented in concert with the creation of the secure channel, which 
discussed in the previous section. Figure 3.2 shows in detail how RSA is used to authenticate 
the mobile device and server, while at the same time creating a secure channel by performing a 
DH key exchange. 
 One of the pieces for authenticating the human user of the mobile device is a visual 
password. The user is actually the last actor in the process to be authenticated so that the 
password is not sent out on the network before a secure channel has been created. By doing 
this, a network sniffing attack is prevented from sniffing the human user’s visual password. 
Visual passwords have an advantage in that they may be easier to remember than a traditional 
text password. This has an additional benefit as well for use in a mHealth application. If the user 
happens to be a stroke or dementia patient, then pictures of known people, places, or things 
may be easier to recall than a similarly strong textual password. The images in the password are 
mapped to values in the range of 1-255 which gives an image password much more strength 
than a textual password with the same number of characters as images.  
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 The user is prompted to choose a certain number of images, in this setup, seven. Of 
those seven chosen images only a certain percentage actually has to be correct. Under this 
implementation five of seven is considered acceptable. This percentage is chosen in an effort to 
make the system more usable. Certain misses are expected because it is often easy to press 
imprecisely on a smart phone’s small screen. This fuzziness prevents the user from having to try 
to enter the visual password multiple times. Figure 3.3 shows the visual password entry screen 
that is presented to the user. 
 
Figure 3.3: mHealth Secure Portal Password Entry Screen 
 
Access Control 
 Access control is a very important aspect of the system. Depending on the user, they 
may have certain restrictions on what data they can write to, or even read. An example of this 
may be a user of the system that is an accountant of a physician’s clinic where a particular 
patient visits. It would be reasonable to expect that the accountant would be privy to 
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information such as social security number, payments due, and other items of a financial 
nature. However, it would be unreasonable for an accountant to have access to items of a 
personal or medical nature, such as what medications a patient is taking, or their weight, et 
cetera. We implement access control on the mobile device using predefined roles that are 
present in OpenEMR. 
 “OpenEMR is a Free and Open Source electronic health records 
and medical practice management application that can run on 
Windows, Linux, Mac OS X, and many other platforms. OpenEMR 
is ONC Complete Ambulatory EHR certified and is one of the most 
popular open source electronic medical records in use today.” 
[30]  
 
 OpenEMR was chosen because it was open source software, and free to use. The use 
of OpenEMR eliminated the need to build an entire server backend that meets all of the 
requirements of HIPAA regulation when one already existed. One of the nice features of 
OpenEMR was that a user can be defined multiple roles, making it easier to segregate out 
which users can access which data. Some of the features of OpenEMR of interest to this system 
are: 
 Ability to Encrypt Patient Documents 
 Supports fine-grained per-user access controls 
 Remotely accessible from any modern web browser with a suitable 
security certificate installed [31] 
 
Android 
 For the mobile device, the Android operating system was chosen. As mentioned in the 
introduction it controls the largest market segment currently, and has the largest potential for 
reach into the mobile device market. In addition to its predominant market share, Android has 
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a robust and full featured development environment. A Java-based programming language is 
used on Android as well, which makes the platform familiar for many developers. There is also a 
simulator available for many different Android devices currently on the market, so that testing 
on many different hardware platforms and operating system versions can be performed easily. 
 Eclipse is a popular integrated development environment (IDE), with plugins 
available for the IDE including the Android Development Tools (ADT) plug-in. The ADT plugin for 
the Eclipse IDE supports some aspects of Java and includes advanced features to ease 
development, testing, and debugging of Android applications. [32] There are some advanced 
features included with the plugin, including the ability develop on Android hardware, as well as 
developing on virtual devices. On-device debugging is included as well. In addition, there are 
GUI builders included to ease the development of user interfaces across multiple device types. 
 
Amazon Web Services 
 AWS was chosen for the cloud server because of their high availability and low cost. A 
virtual machine instance can be easily deployed through the use of a simple web GUI. 
Additional features include the ability to create custom security groups for different servers by 
setting port forwarding and firewalls rules that can be used across multiple virtual machine 
instances. AWS also offers services such as storage solutions, load balancers, elastic 
MapReduce, and elastic internet protocol (IP) addresses, which are essentially static IP address 
for an entire account and not just a single instance. However for our system, we simply needed 
IaaS and opted for a single Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance of a virtual machine. 
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 Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Compute Cloud “is a web service that provides 
resizable compute capacity in the cloud. It is designed to make web-scale computing easier for 
developers.” [33] The elastic portion of EC2 refers to the ability of an instance to be rescaled on 
a short timeframe, minutes. You can instantiate virtual cloud servers on a large scale as 
mentioned in the introduction.  
 
Testing 
 As stated earlier, this work is an extension of previous work. However there was no 
verification that the system performed as it was intended. The fuzzy password implementation 
is a new addition to the overall system.  Some of the work accomplished was testing of the 
entire system. The two key aspects of the system are usability and security. There are many 
different measures of usability. For this experiment, we focused on performance of the 
encryption, decryption, and secure channel creation.  These were chosen because lengthy 
performance times for these operations could render the system of little use. Users expect 
applications to function quickly with low response times and may abandon using them if the 
application does not respond quickly enough. A white paper from Forrester Consulting shows 
that eCommerce web applications have a 40% customer loss at a three second page load time. 
[34] Penetration testing of the purported security of the mHealth Secure Portal is also of vital 
importance. HIPAA compliance demands that the data is kept secure endpoint to endpoint. To 
this end, testing of the security of the created secure channel will be completed.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND EVALUTION 
 
Performance testing was performed on the mHealth Secure Portal by calculating AES 
key creation times as well the amount of time required to encrypt and decrypt large amounts of 
text. To calculate the AES session creation times, the system time was captured before and 
after the start of the AES key creation using the Java currentTimeMillis() method of the System 
class on both the mobile device and the server. Included in this timeframe was the time 
required for the mobile device and server to create the shared key and any time delay in 
communication between the two devices. An AES session key creation time of less than two 
seconds was chosen as a success limit based on research done by Forrester Consulting. [34] 
Similarly, the currentTimeMillis() method was used before and after encryption of large 
amounts of text on the mobile device and before and after decryption time on the server. A 
success limit of two seconds was once again used. 
Penetration testing was performed by capturing data sent from the mobile device to the 
server over a Wi-Fi connection by using a notebook computer in promiscuous mode. The 
resulting Wi-Fi traffic packets were then analyzed using Wireshark to look for patterns in the 
data that was sent to determine if a frequency analysis attack could be performed to determine 
the contents of the encrypted packets. In addition, using the same captured packets, a replay 
attack was attempted by sending the captured packets from a device that had not 
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authenticated with the server. The results from these test can be seen in the final two sections 
of this chapter. 
 
Hardware 
 The hardware in the system consists of two parts, a mobile device, and a cloud server. 
Amazon Web Services was chosen as the cloud server provider using a low-cost t1 micro 
instance. An Android device was chosen as the mobile device, a 2013 Google Nexus 7. The 
mobile device was using the second most up to date version of Android available, Android 4.3 
Jelly Bean. 
 
Authentication 
The authentication protocol used for this experiment is described in Figure 3.4. The 
mobile device and server are first authenticated while creating a secure channel. The results of 
a successful DH key exchange are shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: mHealth Secure Portal DH Key Exchange and Creation of Secure Channel 
 
After the devices have been authenticated, and the secure channel encryption key has 
been created, users are then able to authenticate themselves. By using this methodology the 
user password may be passed without the risk of the password being passed unencrypted. The 
password system used was a visual password system using a grid of 255 different thumbnail 
images. 
Each user has a seven image password. While this may seem like a small password 
length it should be noted that each of the images is mapped to a value from 1-255. This allows 
for a password combination number equal to 2557, or 7 × 1016. Note that a modern day 
password containing uppercase characters, lowercase characters, digits, and special characters 
would have a total of 94 characters from which to choose. This yields a total password 
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combination number equal to 947, or 6.48 × 1013, three orders of magnitude smaller number of 
combinations.  
Some implementation on the fuzzy password system was previously done.  In this 
project, we completed implementation of a fuzzy password system. The fuzzy password system 
allows a user to misclick up to two of the seven picture inputs. The password inputs are still 
position dependent. If a user had a password that mapped to the values {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, then 
a password that mapped to {1, 1, 3, 3, 5, 6, 7} would pass while a password that mapped to {7, 
6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1} would fail. The original project this work was derived from had a faulty password 
system. The password checking allowed for erroneous passwords to be entered. For example, if 
a user had a password consisting of the 1st image repeated seven times, the password would 
map to the value {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1}. However, to get a password match, a user could enter the 
11th image seven times that would result in an incorrect password acceptance of {11, 11, 11, 
11, 11, 11, 11}. This was corrected in the current implementation. 
Each of the images had a value based on its position in the grid of images and so the 
images chosen by the user are mapped to their numerical values. These numerical values are 
converted to a byte array and encrypted using our AES key that will be discussed in the next 
section. The password is then sent to the server whereupon it is decrypted and compared 
against the password value tied to the user who attempted to login. 
If the user successfully matched the password, then the user had access to the data 
allowed them according to their access level which is determined by the setting for that user 
stored in OpenEMR. This access can range from seeing a list of all users’ usernames, seeing a list 
of patients and information about them, or even allowing a data upload. To prevent one of the 
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more common unsophisticated attacks, the brute force attack, if the passwords do not match 
the user is bumped back to the secure channel creation page. A brute force attack is performed 
by running all possible password combinations known until the proper password is entered, 
garnering the attacker access to the system. For an attacker to attempt this type of an attack 
would take an exceedingly long time since a DH key exchange would need to be performed for 
each iteration of password entry. 
This authentication system is fairly robust as implemented. It is able to prevent a few 
different types of attacks. The aforementioned brute force attack would be thwarted. In 
addition the authentication method prevents, to some degree, all of the threat models 
mentioned earlier, namely sniffing, MITM, loss of device, and impersonation. Sniffing of the 
traffic would yield the attacker little information since anything sent over the communication 
network before encryption still requires knowledge of the both the mobile device and the cloud 
server’s private RSA keys. A MITM attack is prevented for the same reason of needing private 
key information about both devices. A loss of device would not be a hardship because of the 
number of password combinations possible. Finally impersonation would fail even if an attacker 
had private key information for the mobile device as the password would still be required for 
system entry. However it should be noted that if the server’s private key information were 
known to an attacker then the entire system would be compromised since that would mean an 
attacker could enter the server through other means.  
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Encryption 
The Bouncy Castle encryption provider was used for our actual encryption, provides a 
cryptographic application programming interface (API) for the Java and C# programming 
languages. 
The encryption process begins with the DH key exchange. Public/private RSA keys are 
used to sign the pieces of the exchange in the DH protocol to prevent MITM attacks. The public 
RSA keys of the devices must be known to each other. In our case the public key values were 
hard coded into the system. After the DH key exchange has been performed the mobile device 
and cloud server each have a value that is used to make a SHA-256 message digest that in turn 
creates a 256 bit symmetric encryption/decryption AES key. The AES key can be seen in Figure 
4.1 in the third text box from the top.  
It is also important to note that this key is a one-time pad (OTP). The mobile device and 
the cloud server only use this key for a single session. If a new session is requested, then a new 
key must be created and should be distinct from any previous key that was created in a 
previous session. This makes a replay attack impossible using an old session key. This session 
key is then used for all other communications sent from either device to the other and allows 
the user to login without worry of their password being compromised by an attacker that is 
sniffing on the network. In addition, this encryption method prevents MITM attacks as the man 
in the middle would not have the ability to determine the AES encryption key. In the case of a 
lost device, no information about the human user is kept on the device so there is nothing to be 
encrypted on the device itself.  
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Access Control 
The final piece of HIPAA requirement is that there is some sort of access control 
mechanism in place to prevent someone from accessing data outside of what is allowed on a 
user-by-user basis. OpenEMR is used as the primary source for access control. There are built-in 
access levels that are used in the implementation. While the access levels could always become 
more fine-grained, there are currently four access levels. 
The first access level is that of an administrator. Administrators are given access to 
information that would be pertinent to them, which consists of all of the data on the system 
that does not contain healthcare records. 
The next type of user is defined as a therapist. This user role would include physicians 
and clinicians that work with patients. The therapist has access to a list of all of the patients 
that are currently seeing them and their medical history. Therapists cannot see the medical 
information of patients that are not associated with them. 
The final non-patient type is an accountant. This type of user is denied access to medical 
information about patients. They should however have information to billing records, missed 
payments, etc. Currently, the accountant is allowed to view a list of patients that are associated 
with the practice that the accountant works for. 
The final access role is that of a patient. While a patient has a right to view all of the 
records pertaining to them, both financial and medical. In addition to retrieval, the system is 
currently designed to collect information from the patient remotely using sensors and mobile 
devices. 
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Usability 
A key aspect of any application is its usability. At the beginning of the interaction a user 
is presented with a screen that allows them to enter their username that has previously been 
registered with the OpenEMR backend that is running on the cloud server. Figure 4.2 shows the 
username entry screen. This is a simple interface and easy to understand. After entering a 
username the user is presented with a page that will allow them to create a secure channel 
between the mobile device and the cloud server. See Figure 4.1. This page would not be shown 
to the user in a production application, however it is shown here for clarification purposes. In 
practice, the secure channel creation and device authentication would take place between the 
username entry screen and the password entry screen as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: mHealth Secure Portal Username Entry Screen 
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 The most important aspect as far as usability goes for the system is the visual password 
employed. Visual passwords can be easier to remember than a lengthy textual password of 
similar security. This may be especially important if the person using the system happens to be 
a dementia or stroke patient that has diminished mental capacity. If the user enters the wrong 
password for the username they are bumped back to the secure channel creation page. To 
make the system more usable however a reset button is included. This can be seen in Figure 
3.1, a user is allowed to reset their attempt at entering the password. Currently as the user 
enters their password, a numerical representation is shown to the user as can be seen in Figure 
4.3. This would not be included in a production release of the application, but is shown here for 
demonstration purposes. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: mHealth Secure Portal Password Accepted 
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Encryption and Decryption Performance 
 Results were gathered to see how well both of the devices performed as far as being 
able to encrypt or decrypt data in a timely manner. To assure that prior data was not retained 
in memory and skewing the actual results, the setup for the results included restarting the 
server and the application itself. This problem was discovered during testing. It was noticed that 
without restarting the device and the server result times did indeed lower with each successive 
attempt. For testing purposes a text document with 65,536 characters was used. This is 
equivalent to a 19-27 page document using Times New Roman and a 12 point font. The 
variation in page size comes from the character used. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of 20 
rounds of encrypting the document before sending it to the server. Note that all times listed are 
strictly for the encryption of the data and do not include the time taken to transfer the 
encrypted data to the server. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Mobile Device Encryption Times 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
3435363738394041424344454647484950515253545556575859
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
O
cc
u
rr
e
n
ce
s
Time in Milliseconds
Distribution of Encryption Time
 33 
 The mean for all 20 runs was approximately 42 ms with a standard deviation of 
approximately 8 milliseconds. More detailed information can be seen in Table 4.1 
 
Table 4.1: Statistical Information on Mobile Device Encryption 
Mean 41.77777778 ms 
Standard Deviation 7.952473204 ms 
Minimum 34 ms 
Maximum 59 ms 
Range 25 ms 
-3σ 17.92035816 ms 
+3σ 65.63519739 ms 
 
 Decryption times were a little longer on average, but tighter grouping and hence a 
smaller standard deviation. Decryption on the 64-bit AWS Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS instance 
averaged approximately 59 ms over the course of the 20 test runs. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.2 
show the distribution and statistical information, respectively, for the decryption times from 
testing. 
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of Cloud Server Decryption Times 
  
Table 4.2: Statistical Information on Cloud Server Decryption 
Mean 58.83333333 ms 
Standard Deviation 2.74933147 ms 
Minimum 56 ms 
Maximum 67 ms 
Range 11 ms 
-3σ 50.58533892 ms 
+3σ 67.08132774 ms 
 
 
 Since the creation of the secure channel is such an integral part of this system, testing 
was also done on how long creation of the AES session key took for each of the devices. While 
AES key creation times on the Android device appear to be much slower than those of the cloud 
server, it is important to remember that the protocol requires the server to calculate the AES 
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and statistical information for AES key creation time on the Android device. The mean time for 
AES key creation was approximately 1.7 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of Mobile Device AES Key Creation Times  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: Statistical Information on Mobile Device AES Key Creation Times 
Mean 1704 ms 
Standard Deviation 106.5965456 ms 
Minimum 1591 ms 
Maximum 1875 ms 
Range 284 ms 
-3σ 1384.210363 ms 
+3σ 2023.789637 ms 
 
 Finally, Figure 4.7 and Table 4.4 show the distribution and statistical information for 
cloud server AES key creation times. Notice, that while the mean for the cloud server is less 
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than a third the value of that from the mobile device, their ranges are very similar to each 
other. This is most likely because the cryptographic library used on the mobile device is a 
derivation of the one used on the cloud server, Spongy Castle and Bouncy Castle respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Distribution of Cloud Server AES Key Creation Times  
 
 
Table 4.4: Statistical Information on Cloud Server AES Key Creation Times 
Mean 420.5555556 ms 
Standard Deviation 97.3907969 ms 
Minimum 326 ms 
Maximum 587 ms 
Range 261 ms 
-3σ 128.3831649 ms 
+3σ 712.7279462 ms 
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mean for the AES key creation time for the mobile device was close to the two second limit, it 
seems it is an acceptably fast system. 
 
Penetration Testing 
 The application that was developed was designed to be secure, so penetration testing 
was performed to ensure that the design was as secure as intended. There are many attack 
vectors to consider when testing how securely and robustly the design performs. However, 
some of the attack vectors are considered outside of the purview of this testing. For example, 
the server that the mobile device connects with could be attacked using a distributed denial-of-
service attack (DDoS), whereby the server’s resources would be depleted by a large number of 
connections being attempted at one time by a malicious user. Indeed, this sort of attack would 
most likely be successful in preventing the mobile device from successfully connecting to the 
server. However, this type of attack is more a concern in regards to the availability of the 
system, whereas the primary concern of this particular system in regards to this study is the 
confidentiality of data in regards to HIPAA compliance. There are however two important 
attack methods that were attempted against the current application, namely packet analysis 
and a replay attack. Both were attempted using packets that were passively sniffed while the 
mobile device and cloud server were communicating throughout both the secure channel setup 
and the transference off data from the mobile device to the cloud server. 
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Packet Capture 
 For the purposes of this study the data was captured on a non-secured Wi-Fi network. 
This was done for simplicity’s sake. To capture date on a secured Wi-Fi connection additional 
setup would be needed. Namely, to capture traffic on a secured Wi-Fi network, an additional 
attack would need to be performed since the data would have an additional encryption layer 
because of the network, e.g. WPA2-PSK. The attack required is an ARP cache poisoning attack 
and would need to be performed against both the network’s router and the target. Essentially 
the attacker would perform a man in the middle attack whereby the router would talk to the 
attacker thinking it was the victim, and the victim would talk to the attacker thinking it was the 
router. In this way the traffic could be analyzed without the added layer of encryption provided 
on the secured network. It is important to note that to perform an attack, or even capture the 
data stream from the mobile device to the cloud server, over a cellular network is non-trivial 
and currently not possible. 
 For the data capture that was performed, there were two required elements. The first is 
a wireless network interface card capable of being placed in promiscuous and monitor mode. 
The second was some sort of packet capture software. There are multiple options for both of 
these requirements and two different of the software options were tested. For the hardware, a 
2012 MacBook Pro was used. The wireless network interface card in the MacBook can be 
placed in both promiscuous and monitor mode. For software the first option tested was the 
built-in Wireless Diagnostics application which is a part of Apple’s OS X. Wireless Diagnostics 
includes many useful utilities such as the ability to scan for Wi-Fi networks and display the 
network’s bandwidth and channel. More importantly Wireless Diagnostics allows a user to 
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capture network traffic by saving all of the 802.11 WLAN frames to a file with a .wcap 
extension. The second option was to use the popular Wireshark packet sniffing software. When 
using Wireshark, the wireless network interface card must be placed in monitor mode to 
capture the traffic that was sent from the Nexus tablet. Wireshark saves the captured frames in 
a .pcapng file format, which is the preferred file format. In addition, when capturing the live 
traffic the frames can be viewed live. Since analysis of the packets is not possible using Wireless 
Diagnostics, Wireshark was chosen for both packet capture and analysis. Figure 4.8 shows the 
Wireshark interface during a live packet capture. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Live Packet Capture Using Wireshark 
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Packet Analysis 
 One of the benefits of using Wireshark is the aforementioned ability to analyze the 
captured information. Wireshark allows deep inspection of the packets and can filter out 
unwanted packets using filters. It is not unreasonable to assume that an attacker attacking this 
system would be able to identify the IP address of the cloud server by resolving the address 
from the domain name where the OpenEMR portal can be reached. Once the IP address has 
been obtained by the attacker the captured packets can be filtered by using one of three filters. 
The first, ip.addr, will show all packets either being sent to or received from the IP address. 
The second, ip.src will filter out all packets other than those that originated at the IP 
address. Finally, ip.dst allows the viewing of only packets that were sent to the IP address. 
Using these last two filters allows a more granular look at the traffic as far as determining what 
was sent to or from the target server/IP address. 
 Once the packets were obtained from the communication between the mobile device 
and the cloud server, the first step was to filter out the unwanted traffic using the method 
above. The remaining packets’ payload was inspected, that is to say, the data portion of the 
packet, and not the header information of the packet, was looked at using Wireshark. Both 
plaintext data and encrypted data was sent between the server and client. The former was sent 
strictly for informational purposes to be used in this study. Figure 4.9 shows a packet of 
plaintext data being analyzed. The payload, or data, portion of the packet is highlighted. It is 
important to note that in this figure the first character highlighted, w, is equivalent to the value 
77 in raw data, which is the ASCII value for lowercase w. There are other w characters in the text 
and they map to the appropriate raw data as well. 
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Figure 4.9: Packet Payload in Plaintext 
 
 However when looking at packets that contain ciphertext instead of plaintext, the 
results are obviously different. When correlating the position of the first letter w in the 
plaintext in Figure 4.10 we can see that it maps to 77 in raw data. As well, the last character in 
the third to last line is w and maps to 77 as well. However in Figure 4.10 we can see that the 
ciphertext version of the same data is a period, as is the last character in the third to last line. It 
is of note however that the raw data values are different, ba for the first character, and 91 for 
the other. The periods don’t represent the actual value, but instead are replacement characters 
used by Wireshark to denote values that are outside of the range of displayable, or even 
legitimate ASCII characters. In this case ba and 91 in ASCII are both not legitimate characters. 
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Figure 4.10: Packet Payload in Ciphertext 
 
 Knowing that many ciphers have a set block size, we can look at more ciphertexts to try 
to discern any patterns. However it should be noted that some block ciphers use previous 
blocks to alter the later blocks. There are benefits to this chaining of blocks, but also downsides. 
If there is an error in transmission of a chained block, then all following blocks will not be able 
to be decrypted. However chaining has the benefit of not having identical blocks of ciphertext 
when using the same key on the same plaintext. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show repeating patterns 
in plaintext and ciphertext respectively. 
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Figure 4.11: Repeating Pattern in Plaintext 
 
  
Figure 4.12: Repeating Pattern in Ciphertext 
 
 Based on packets that have been examined so far, it is easy to see patterns in the 
ciphertext. This tells us that a block cipher is indeed being used in the system. However, up to 
this point it is still not possible to determine the block size of the encryption method. To get 
even further into the inspection of the packets’ payload, a final set of plaintext and ciphertext is 
examined. Figure 4.14 shows a ciphertext of a repeated ASCII character. 
 
  
Figure 4.13: Smallest Repeating Pattern in Ciphertext 
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 Based on Figure 4.13, if an attacker captured ciphertext of a repeated string, which is 
possible if not probable, they would be able to determine multiple things. Since each of the 
characters on the left represent a hexadecimal value, which is 2^4 bits, and there are 32 
hexadecimal characters in each repeated section, the attacker would know that the block size 
of encryption being used is 128 bits, which is indicative of AES encryption. Furthermore, since a 
block is being repeated in the ciphertext it is evident that the mode of AES encryption is 
Electronic CodeBook (ECB). 
 The real question for this system then becomes, can an attacker glean any information 
from sniffing packets with encrypted payload being sent between the cloud server and mobile 
device? We know that the system is sending data between the mobile device and cloud server 
as characters, and that each character is comprised of a single byte. Given this, the blocks being 
sent are 16 text characters long. The image shown in Figure 4.14 is the Linux Tux mascot both 
unencrypted and encrypted using AES in ECB mode. This combination is often used when 
describing the shortfalls of ECB in reference to a frequency analysis attack as the image is still 
discernible when encrypted. Our system is used primarily as a means to send mobile device 
sensor data to the cloud server. It does, however, also send textual data to differing user roles. 
With that in mind, for an attacker to decrypt sniffed traffic a frequency analysis would have to 
be performed on blocks of ciphertext that are 16 characters long. Repeated language 
characters are not analogous to the repeated information that is easy to perform a frequency 
analysis on in Figure 4.14. Of particular import are the sections of pseudo-randomness that 
occur in Figure 4.14. These sections are portions of the encrypted image that are not one of the 
three main colors in the original image. While our system does send textual data that has been 
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encrypted to some of the user roles, the volume sent needed to perform a frequency analysis, 
along with the non-trivial nature of doing so on 16 character long blocks indicate that AES 
encryption is ECB mode is adequate for our needs. In addition, the benefit of not having data 
corrupted due to an error in a block of block chained ciphertext makes the use of ECB 
worthwhile. 
 
 [35] 
Figure 4.14: Frequency Analysis of Tux Encrypted Using AES in ECB Mode 
 
 
Replay Attack 
 A replay attack is an attack that is accomplished by sending previously captured traffic 
between two different actors. In our case the traffic that is retransmitted is the traffic that were 
the original packets sent between the cloud server and mobile device used for setting up the 
secure channel and for authenticating the actors, namely the cloud server, mobile device, and 
the user of the mobile device. Having already captured all packets transmitted between the 
server and client for the packet analysis, this attack required using a different portion of the 
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packets than used previously. In our scenario, the attack consists of attempting to login to the 
cloud server as a legitimate mobile device. 
 To transmit the packets from the attacking machine to the target machine two different 
tools were used, primarily to verify the results. The first tool is tcpreplay, which is actually a 
collection of command-line interface tools that allow the user to perform many actions. Of 
particular interest is the ability to replay a captured set of packets contained in a .pcap file. The 
second tool is bit-twist, another command-line interface tool that is an Ethernet packet 
generator. Bit-twist allows a user to perform essentially the same function as tcpreplay, namely 
the ability to generate Ethernet traffic from a previously captured network session. 
 The failure of this attack was succinct when attempted, hence the use of two different 
tools. The cloud server would not create a new server thread. This behavior was expected, as 
each session between a mobile device and the cloud server included a prime number created 
from a pseudo-random number. Essentially this creates a nonce. As a nonce is only used for a 
single cryptographic communication, any attempt to reuse the nonce fails. This is because the 
nonce used was for the creation of the DH keys. Attempting to reuse the DH key results in a 
non-matching DH key on the client and server sides. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Objectives of the Study 
This study sought to devise a method of creating a secure system for transmitting EHR, 
which included three essential security elements: authentication, encryption, and access 
control. These three criteria are essential in maintaining HIPAA compliance. The study also 
required an actual implementation of the resulting protocol as well as testing to ensure that 
data could indeed be sent securely in a timely manner. 
The system design included a method of authenticating mobile devices and the cloud 
servers with which they communicate.  The system design also required a method of 
authenticating users through a visual password system. The authentication methods had to be 
resilient against a number of different threat models as well. Encryption was a primary goal of 
this study. The data in a HIPAA-compliant application must keep all EHR data encrypted to 
prevent loss of personal medical information of patients. Beyond authenticating all of the 
actors involved in transactions, and encrypting all of the data, the application required the use 
of access control. Depending on the user of the system, there is certain information that must 
remain privileged depending upon the user’s role, e.g. an accountant should not have access 
rights to a patient’s mental health history. 
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Conclusions and Contributions 
The protocol that was designed was successfully implemented to meet the objectives of 
the study. Through the use of timing testing, it was shown that the encryption of data that is 
sent between the mobile device and the cloud server was done in a timely manner as shown in 
Chapter IV. In addition it was shown that creation time of the keys required to create and 
ensure a secure channel between the server and mobile device was temporally acceptable. The 
application showed to be robust against multiple attack vectors by testing of the encrypted 
data that was sent between the mobile device and server after the secure channel was created. 
This was done through passive packet sniffing and evaluation as would be done in a real attack 
scenario. 
The application that was developed to meet the protocol requirements was able to 
successfully collect patient data in an unobtrusive manner. In addition to collecting patient 
data, the application had to be able for medical staff to access information about their patients. 
Administrative personnel could use the application to check any number of records relating to 
the running of a medical practice. Accountants could use the application for tracking financial 
information about medical practices they work for. In addition, the protocol had to be well 
suited for use in a real world HIPAA-compliant medical application. There were a couple of 
potential uses that can be envisioned for its use as a mHealth application in remote monitoring. 
Stroke patients often have diminished motor skills. An application could developed that 
would allow for a stroke patient to use a smart phone as a fall detection device. By using the 
protocol devised, data collected from the sensors of the patient’s smart phone could be sent in 
a secure and encrypted manner to a cloud server. Depending on the data sent to the cloud 
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server, the patient’s physician could be notified of a potential fall the next time the physician 
authenticates and connects to the secured system. This could reduce the amount of time a 
patient is in pain. Another potential use is for patients with dementia. In some cases dementia 
patients have a tendency to wander and get lost. With the bevy of chips and radios that a smart 
device can access, such as GPS and Wi-Fi, it is trivial for a device to determine its location. A 
predetermined geo-fence could be set up so that if a dementia patient were to breach its 
perimeter then a notification could be sent to the cloud server backend. This could drastically 
reduce the time to find a missing patient. 
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
While the objectives of the study were met, during development, many opportunities 
for improvement were considered. Additional threats were noticed that the current system 
does not mitigate. In lieu of the system’s need to remain HIPAA compliant, the findings have 
broken down into the three sections needed to keep the system within regulation. Some of the 
recommendations could be instituted in a minor upgrade to the current system. Others 
however would lead to a fundamental change in how certain portions of the application have 
been written. 
 
Authentication 
Authentication was a very important aspect of this study. If any of the actors in the 
system were not who they say they were, then the entire system was a failure. While the visual 
password currently being used was sufficient for authentication, it was still susceptible to 
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shoulder surfing attacks. One of the reasons for this is that the same images were chosen each 
time. This is compounded by the fact that the images were in the same position in the grid. One 
option was to randomize the images location, and have associated metadata for each image 
related to its mapped value the same no matter where it was in the grid. This however 
presented a secondary problem in that the grid had 255 images. Trying to locate all seven of the 
images would be a time consuming task for the user. A better option might be to use a method 
similar to that used in Design and Evaluation of a Shoulder-Surfing Resistant Graphical 
Password Scheme. This method is resilient to shoulder surfing attacks as the user is not actually 
clicking on the images that comprise their password, but instead prove they know the secret by 
clicking within the n-gon created by the location of the images. By using this method they prove 
they know the secret without giving up the secret. This could be done in multiple iterations as 
well, which would lead to a true fuzzy vault, zero-knowledge authentication system for the 
user. 
In addition to a different password system for authentication, it would be advantageous 
to add some sort of logic to the server so that multiple login attempts were attempted 
unsuccessfully after a DH exchange from the same mobile device. That type of activity could be 
an indication that a device has been lost or stolen and an attacker is trying to brute force the 
system. The owner of the device could be contacted automatically through email or other 
means to determine if the device has been lost or stolen. Logic could also be added to block a 
device based on their public key if the device has been known to be compromised. 
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Encryption 
 Currently the encryption mechanism is fairly robust against threats. However there is 
always room for improvement in cryptographic systems. Some of these improvements would 
be simple enhancements to the current code. Others involve work on the server administration 
side of things.  
Currently the prime numbers for the DH key exchange are created programmatically 
with a prime number generator seeded with a number from a pseudorandom number 
generator. This could be improved by using sensor data from the smart device to create a truly 
random number based on user movements collected over the course of a few seconds and 
taking the resulting value as the seed for the prime number generator. In addition, higher levels 
of encryption could be used, that is to say use higher bit encryption for AES and RSA, or a more 
secure AES mode such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) in lieu of the currently used ECB mode. 
This isn’t strictly necessary, but as computational resources become cheaper and easier to 
come by, eventually current day best-practice encryption will have to be improved. 
 Currently, there is unencrypted data on the server that contains fake patient sensor 
data, which should be considered EHR. This data is sent to the server in an encrypted and 
secure manner. To truly be HIPAA-compliant, that data should be stored in an encrypted 
manner, and certainly not in a human readable text document. 
 Not really related to encryption specifically, but the server where all of the information 
is stored could use some hardening, as could the installation of OpenEMR. OpenEMR is fairly 
robust against threats, but there are documents on specifically how to harden it. Since this was 
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a proof-of-concept and not a production server, less care was taken in its set up than would be 
warranted otherwise. 
 
Access Control 
 OpenEMR has wonderful levels of access control built into it. However more fine-
grained access levels could be developed. In addition, some of the access control roles may be 
superfluous. For example, if the system were going to be used for a research study, then it 
would most likely be unnecessary to have an access role for an accountant. However, new roles 
may need to be created for different levels of researchers. 
 
General 
 While the current implementation is functional there are some flaws in its design. 
Namely, the method for assigning a password to a user is not well implemented. A user’s 
password for the mobile to cloud server communication is different than the user’s web login 
to OpenEMR. There is no easy way to have those passwords be the same as it would require 
users of the web portal to memorize a septet of, potentially, three digit numbers. This is 
outside the ability of most people. In addition, the mobile to cloud server password is stored as 
a plaintext value in the user’s information page. This means it is also stored in the MySQL 
database that OpenEMR uses in plaintext as well. This drastically needs to be revamped, but 
currently no potential methods have been identified. 
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